



The Making of Modern Scholarship on Commercial Law in Nineteenth- and 
Twentieth-Century Finland: Models and Adaptations 
I. The Growth of Commercial Law as a Discipline: International Models 
The identity of commercial law has always been unclear. What legal institutions or bundles of 
norms actually belong to it? How should commercial law be distinguished from other fields of 
private law? And not only private law, for commercial law is one of the branches of law most 
difficult to place within the dichotomy of private and public law. Pollock and Maitland, then, 
identified commercial law via a law of proof:  
The law merchant [...] seems to have been rather a special law for mercantile 
transactions than a special law for merchants. It would we think have been found 
chiefly to consist of what would now be called rules of evidence, rules about the 
proof to be given of sales and other contracts, rules as to the legal value of the 
tally and the God's penny […]1 
In 1915, Arthur Nussbaum stated that “commercial law is no longer a law of commerce, but 
just a collection of quite distinct materials.”2 A leading Finnish commercial lawyer has 
recently pointed out that many of his colleagues actually do things that have little to do with 
commercial law, by any definition, but rather with fields such as general contract law, labour 
law or competition law.3 Even after almost 150 years of existence as an academic discipline, 
commercial law is still lacking a theory and identity.4  
Theory and identity have everything to do with the creation of a discipline. This article seeks 
to place the birth of Finnish commercial law, with the help of comparative legal history, in an 
international context. Section two of the article delves into the different European models of 
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understanding and systematizing norms applied to merchant relations in the early modern 
period. Section three deals with the nineteenth- and twentieth-century development of 
commercial law as an academic discipline, focusing in particular on nineteenth-century 
Finland and, for comparison, certain other European countries. The fourth and final section 
draws conclusions based on the findings presented in the article.  
 
II. Commercial Law Scholarship in the Making: The Early Modern Period 
Talking about commercial law as a branch of legal literature before the nineteenth century is, 
strictly speaking, anachronistic. Commercial law as a branch of law was a nineteenth-century 
invention – as was the whole systematization of law into modern disciplines – but the sources 
of commercial law cannot be properly understood if detached from its early roots.5 To 
understand the different ways commercial law grew as a distinct discipline in different parts 
of the Western world in the nineteenth century, it is necessary to look deeper into its history.  
Despite the fact that northern Italy lost its leading position in European commerce after the 
Middle Ages, early modern Italian legal scholarship enormously influenced the development 
of commercial law in other parts of Europe. The best examples are Benvenuto Stracca (1509–
1578; De mercatura, 1553), Sigismundo Scaccia (1564–1634; Tractatus de commerciis et 
cambio, 1618) and Casaregis (1670–1737; Discursis legales et commercio, 1707). Stracca in 
particular is known as a practitioner who for the first time presented the body of commercial 
law known as the law merchant in its entirety, combining a Romanist tradition originating in 
the Middle Ages with a profound knowledge of commercial and court practice. For Stracca, the 
law merchant was a combination of rules pertaining to merchants that did not include the 
norms pertaining to exchange.6  
Special legal norms pertaining to commercial relations – legal arrangements concerning 
contractual relations affecting merchants, commercial enterprises, insurance matters, conflict 
resolution and regulation issues, and bankruptcy – emerged as different from other parts of 
the law, such as contract norms based on Roman law, in many Western European regions 
already in the early modern period. In other regions, general law pertaining to contracts and 
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procedure continued governing mercantile situations.7 Some of the norms that originally 
applied to merchant relations only now regulated all contractual relations. Examples abound. 
The good faith of the possessor of stolen goods was originally protected amongst market 
merchants only, but in the sixteenth century the rule came to be applied more generally in 
continental law.8 This type of change in meanings was not particular to just commercial law. 
In the early modern period, many medieval legal concepts acquired new meaning. Suffice it to 
mention how dominium changed from a feudal term related to ….. 
In the Middle Ages, commercial law in Europe was institutionalized in two basic models. In 
the southern part of the continent (along the Iberian, Dalmatian and Adriatic coasts), 
merchant courts, in which merchants themselves served as judges, resolved commercial 
cases. In north-western Europe, commercial cases were tried in normal urban and princely 
courts, in which merchants’ privileges often safeguarded them against seizure and arrest, or 
guaranteed them quicker proceedings. In the south, the merchants made the rules themselves, 
whereas in the north the urban or princely privileges were essential to shaping the ius 
mercatorum. Both in southern and northern Europe, the earliest forms of commercial law 
concerned the relationship between merchants and those involved in maritime transport. In 
the case of producers, transporters and merchants, exceptions were made to the general legal 
rules. It was also typical from early on that merchants were allowed to solve their cases via 
arbitrage procedure.9 
Despite the fact that arbitration procedures were quite common, the early modern state 
gradually took increasing control over commerce and merchants’ affairs. In the early modern 
period, European commercial courts appeared in three forms. The southern model of 
consulados, typical of Spain (Burgos 1494, Bilbao 1511, Seville 1543), was based on the 
relative independence of merchants, who chose to serve as judges in their courts, although 
often in conjunction with professional lawyers or experienced lay judges. However, the 
importance of political power-holders was great also here as regards both the founding of the 
consular courts as well as putting commercial customs into writing. In the northern model, 
such as practiced in the Netherlands or England, no special merchant courts emerged, 
although merchants could have a say in commercial adjudication. The successful French 
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model, based on the commercial courts (juridictions consulaires) founded in the mid-
seventeenth century, was a compromise between the southern and northern models. As in the 
case of Burgos, French merchants chose the judge from amongst themselves, but the 
commercial courts had jurisdiction only up to a certain value amount in the case. If the value 
exceeded that amount, the case fell under a royal court’s jurisdiction. Researchers have 
pointed out the importance of state formation as one of the main reasons behind the 
difference between southern and eastern Europe. In the northern part of Europe, the 
strengthening modern state sought control over all forms of legal decision-making, 
commercial adjudication included.10 
In recent years, historians – mainly economic historians – have intensely debated the 
interplay between commerce, state and urban institutions, and private ordering. In his study 
of Jewish merchants trading in the eleventh and twelfth centuries between Italy and the 
Maghrebi region of North Africa, Avril Greif underlined the importance of merchants’ own 
cultural beliefs and social norms for arranging commerce independently of the influence of 
political rulers.11 Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvy have questioned Greif’s results, 
however, pointing out that the commercial transactions of the Maghrebi traders were in fact 
subject to formals rules enforceable by secular or religious courts.12 To similar effect, scholars 
have also noted that medieval merchant guilds operating abroad always functioned with the 
license of their home government and their host abroad.13 Oscar Gelderblom, in this study of 
late medieval and early modern Dutch cities, drew interesting conclusions that fall 
somewhere between these two positions. He claims that strong towns, such as Bruges, 
Antwerp and Amsterdam, developed flexible legal institutions able to accommodate foreign 
merchants and their commercial customs within the same local system.14  
The discussion surrounding the material norms employed in commercial conflict resolution 
has been subject to debate as well. To put it briefly, the narrative of medieval lex mercatoria, 
with European merchants having a common law merchant in the Middle Ages and to an extent 
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in the early modern period also, became popular after Lewin Goldschmidt had invented it in 
the 1880s. The idea of lex mercatoria received a strong boost in 1983, when Harold Berman 
adapted it for his influential Law and Revolution. Subsequently, legal historians have gradually 
dismantled the theory and demonstrated that a common law merchant never existed for all of 
Europe, neither in a procedural nor in a substantive meaning of the term.  
How did Swedish (and Finnish) law of the early modern period relate to the European 
histories of commercial law? Was there something that could be called commercial law in 
early modern Sweden?  As I have explained elsewhere,15 special rules governing relations 
between merchants had begun to be codified in the Middle Ages, and in the city laws of Birka 
and Wisby, which included large provisions regarding maritime commercial law.  The Town 
Law of King Magnus Eriksson of 1352 was based on a similar idea: as part of a comprehensive 
code of law, it also included rules concerning the commercial activities of town-dwellers. 
Obviously, their needs differed from those of rural people, who could get by with general rules 
of private law, applicable to all situations of life.16  
A commercial regulation applying to the whole realm had gradually emerged by the 
seventeenth century. Norms and regulations, which later became commercial law, pertained 
mostly to two branches of regulation. First, a vast regulatory framework necessary for 
mercantilist policies was part of “cameral” or “police” regulation.17 Second, a large number of 
special rules on private law for merchants were categorized under maritime law.  Maritime 
transportation, maritime insurance, and maritime corporations had little to do with the legal 
needs of other merchants operating domestically. In Sweden, no sensible entity such as a law 
common to all merchants existed. Most of Sweden’s international commerce was done by sea, 
whereas simple domestic commerce could function quite well with general rules of private 
law.   
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Legal literature, however, was scarce in all fields, and even fewer authors concerned 
themselves with commercial questions. One of the few who did, Johannes Loccenius, who was 
of German origin, touched upon them in his De iure maritime & navali (1652), which 
contained chapters on maritime insurance, transportation contracts and companies and one 
on procedural questions regarding litigation arising from maritime contracts and commercial 
contracts. Loccenius referred to German, Dutch and other European sources, such as Pedro de 
Santarem’s (Pedro Santerna Lusitano) Tractatus de assecurationes, Hugo Grotius and Vinnius, 
as well as to the Amsterdam and Antwerp statutes.18 Maritime law of the early modern period 
included everything having to do with seafaring, which, in other words, was subject to the 
systematizing principle. Some of the rules included in the maritime law of Loccenius were of a 
kind that had no direct connection to merchants or commerce, such as maritime defence, 
privileges pertaining to shipbuilding, freedom of navigation, shipwrecks and fishing rights, as 
well as extensive sections dedicated to piracy (II:3), navigational security, property rights to 
ship, hereditary rights to ship, delicts and procedure.19 Some of the subjects were closely 
related to commercial activities. These subjects included staple rights (I:X) and rights 
pertaining to bottomry (foenus nauticum), jettison (iactus), contribution (contributio) and 
contracts and other obligations. Thus, Loccenius went through the whole legal system from 
the point of view seafaring, and commercial activities were only part of the larger picture. The 
same can be said of Jacob Albrekt Flintberg’s (1751–1804) approach. His Anmärkningar till 
Sveriges rikes sjölag concerned only maritime law, although the work included an introduction 
to bankruptcy procedure as well.20  
 
In general terms, David Nehrman (1695–1769) was even more important because his work 
encompassed the earlier seventeenth-century developments in all major fields of law and his studies 
continued to dominate the field until almost the start of the nineteenth century. In his Inledning til 
then Swenska Jurisprudentiam Civilem of 1729 (Introduction to Swedish Civil Law), Nehrman 
explained the Swedish system of company law – which was equal to societas.21 Otherwise, 
Nehrman did not touch upon commercial matters. This lack of interest on Nehrman’s part is quite 
telling of the fact that domestic commerce did well within the general rules of contract law and 
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there was very little need for any special commercial law as such.22 As far as foreign commerce was 
concerned, commercial law was part of maritime law, which included many kinds of legal norms 
other than just the law merchant. This was the situation when commercial law as a modern 
discipline started to emerge in the nineteenth century. 
 
To sum up so far: commercial regulations developed in Sweden already in the Middle Ages, and 
some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Swedish authors showed interest in commercial matters. 
However, it would be an exaggeration to speak of Swedish commercial law as an academic 
specialization in any sense of the word in the early modern period.  
 
 
III. Creating Commercial Law as a Modern Legal Discipline: Europe, Sweden, Finland 
 
When can we talk about a distinct legal discipline in the modern sense of the word? Clearly, it 
would at least be when three prerequisites have been fulfilled. First, a discipline needs to have 
people who specialize in the subject and identify with it, usually by giving it a name: 
“environmental law”, “labour law”, or “commercial law”. Second, at the next stage a discipline 
will typically become institutionalized. It will have professorial chairs, learned societies and 
eventually journals. It will be taught as a separate subject at universities. Third, if we are 
dealing with continental law, it will also have a “general theory”, or rules that are common to 
the whole field.   
I will start with the first prerequisite, specialization and identification. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, as mentioned already, commercial law as a separate entity did not exist 
in Sweden. Instead, rules pertaining to commerce were categorized under “police”, the legal 
nature of which was not quite clear in the first place, or under maritime law, the significance 
of which was clear enough for the northern state. 
This was the situation when Sweden lost its eastern half, Finland, to the Russian Empire in 
1809 as a result of the Napoleonic Wars. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
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economic and political situation described above, which Finland had shared with its former 
mother country, Sweden, began to change. However, these changes effected no fundamental 
changes in the law until the latter half of the century – neither in Finland nor in Sweden.23 We 
now turn our attention to Finland. The police as a legal category was being dismantled, and 
the rules that had thitherto comprised it had to find new homes in the emerging modern 
branches of law. A wave of liberalization swept through Finland. The legal reforms started in 
1856, when the liberal-minded Czar Alexander II, presented a programme of social and 
economic reforms during his visit to the Grand Duchy. The Emperor demanded the adoption 
of three measures: 1) the developing industries needed a functioning infrastructure of 
railways, roads and channels; 2) the living conditions of the rural poor needed to be 
improved; and 3) economic legislation needed liberalization.24 When the Diet (the Grand 
Duchy’s legislative body) reconvened in 1862, after a recess of more than half a century, a list 
of the most urgent measures was immediately drawn up and the reforms carried out on a 
piece-by-piece basis throughout the 1860s and 1870s. Freedom of contract saw the light of 
day through a series of legislative acts (Hirelings Act 1865, Industry Act 1868, Marriage Act 
1868). The sphere of legally competent persons widened, and the predictability of exchange 
increased through the Mortgage Act (1868), Warranty Act (1868) and Prescription Act 
(1873). To make the accumulation of capital possible, new banking laws and company 
legislation were needed (Private Banks Act 1866, Act on Limited Companies 1864). Freedom 
of industry became more or less the rule, after several partial reforms, through the Industry 
Act of 1879.25   
Works on legal themes, which later came to form part of commercial law, started to appear in 
Sweden and Finland, and modern legal scholarship, following the German models of the 
historical school and conceptual jurisprudence, was born in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. Examples include J. N. Lang’s work on historical-comparative patent law (1880)26 
and K. H. L. Hammarskjöld’s study on Swedish transportation law (1886).27 Both works were 
clearly inspired by the practical needs of developing business life in both countries. Lang 
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described how the breakdown of the ancient regime with its system of privileges contributed 
to a growing need to protect innovation. The author confirmed the connection between the 
degree of industrialization and the need for protection through copyright law: “Precisely 
those countries, which have been the first to recognize the law of copyright, namely England, 
North America, France, and Belgium, are also the leaders of industrial development.”28 
Although it was thus the most industrialized nations that also needed copyright and patent 
law the most, such institutions were not unnecessary in Finland either, despite its much lower 
degree of industrialization. Patent law was needed not only for reasons of national economy 
and in order to encourage innovation, but also to protect the nation’s honour: Finland, of 
course, should not be a “parasite plant, which earned its main income by exploiting what the 
innovative spirit and industriousness of other nations had created.”29 Neither of these authors 
was concerned, however, with copyright law or transportation law a as part of anything 
resembling commercial law, although Hammarskjöld at some length describes the solutions 
found in the commercial codes of other countries.30  
A couple of decades later, enthusiasm for commercial law was already up in the air. George 
Granfelt began his work on current account (Ital. conto corrente) as a legal institution in a 
somewhat passionate manner. It was, “[i]n our days […] especially commercial law,” which 
was “prepared […] to follow the quick progress of the economy pulsating lively.” Granfelt saw, 
nevertheless, commercial law not as a fully separate branch of law, but as an “intermediary 
station” (“mellanstation”) between customary law and general civil law. Elsewhere, 
commercial law was an “experimental field, a platform for new findings,” and it did not exist 
in Finland. Legal innovations had been introduced in Finnish commercial practice as well, but 
not enough to warrant a whole new field of commercial law: “[…] also in our country the 
business life demonstrates a capability of creating legal institutions, which with increasing 
pressure knock on the closed door  [of general civil law].”31 Granfelt wrote large articles on 
other aspects of commercial law as well, such as security contracts and transportation law.32  
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In Finland, the first legal scholar who clearly started specializing in commercial law and 
identifying with it was Lauri Cederberg (1881–1943). In 1924, Cederberg became the first 
professor of commercial law in Finland, and in fact the chair was the first of its kind in the 
Nordic countries. The funding of the chair came from Alfred Kordelin, an important 
entrepreneur, who had donated the funds in his will.33 This was a time of growing interest in 
the economic development of the new Finnish nation. Economic education was held in 
newfound esteem, the best example of which being the founding of the Helsinki University of 
Economics in 1911. Åbo Akademi University, the only exclusively Swedish-language 
university in Finland, was founded in 1918, and from the start a chair in “commercial, 
industrial, and social law” was created there.34 
One of the first tasks for the new professor was to define the field of commercial law. Having 
studied in Bonn and Berlin, Cederberg was well aware of the latest trends. He had already 
addressed the question in his writings of whether commercial law should be codified. 
Cederberg did not think that it should, although it was clear that both the Finnish law of 
obligations and commerce were in desperate need of reform. The partial statutory reforms 
that had subsequently been made to patch up the provisions of the Swedish Law of the Realm 
of 1734 were not satisfactory. A reform was, or so thought Cederberg, clearly in the interests 
of Finnish commerce. However, Cederberg thought that Finnish commercial law was not yet 
at a stage in which it could be codified. Commercial law had simply not been sufficiently 
worked out in existing scholarship. A codification put into effect too soon, therefore, would 
necessarily need to be overly based on foreign models and would run the risk of losing touch 
with the Finnish legal system. 35 
Interestingly, Cederberg used comparative legal history to argue that in most cases, 
commercial law had been separated from the rest of civil law not so much for “legal” reasons 
as for purely historical reasons. French commercial law was codified in the Napoleonic series 
of codes of 1808, but, as Cederberg correctly remarked, the roots of such codification lay 
firmly in the commercial ordinances of Louis XIV between the years 1673 and 1681. Because 
of the Napoleonic conquests, the model of separate commercial law spread to Belgium, 
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Luxemburg, Greece, Turkey and Serbia, among other places. The influence of the French 
commercial code explained the separation of commercial law in Spain and Portugal as well, 
and the Spanish legal influence in turn in many “non-European” countries. The lack of political 
unity likewise accounted for separate commercial law in Germany: if anywhere, it was 
possible to achieve agreement in the field of commercial law.36 Finland’s situation was 
different, though, because Finnish commercial law was not yet as developed as elsewhere. 
Instead of aiming for a codification of commercial law, Finnish authorities aimed for partial 
reforms and Scandinavian cooperation. Similarly, and again on comparative grounds, 
Cederberg argued that separate commercial courts were not the solution for Finland.37 
Cederberg was in favour of codifying the Finnish law of obligations – although not all of civil 
law – and he thought that commercial law should be included in the code. This, however, did 
not lead him to the conclusion that commercial law could not exist as a separate system (and 
thus, a branch of law). Cederberg, writing in 1925, had read his German authorities and 
quoted Lewin Goldschmidt, according to whom even an uncodified commercial law could be 
“just as extensive and even more extensive than an uncodified one.”38 The essence of 
mercantile activity was the constant need to draw up contracts, in contrast to, for instance 
farmers, who only occasionally prepared such a contract. The “severity of commercial law” 
(“die Strenge des Handelsrechts”) meant that the merchant was judged more severely than 
were ordinary people when informing his commercial partners. They were to perform their 
contractual duties more carefully than ordinary persons, which showed, for instance, in that 
even a slight delay in performing one’s duties could lead to the dissolution of a contract. The 
swiftness of commerce demanded that the rules of commercial law be detailed, clear and easy 
to interpret. On the other hand, a certain amount of flexibility was also needed. A host of 
special norms regarding commercial relations – such as those concerning copyright, 
companies and insurances – called for a separation of commercial law from private law. 
Referring to Jakob Friedrich Behrend, Cederberg distinguished commercial law from general 
civil law in that commercial law was, by its very nature, transnational. Whereas civil law was 
always attached to a particular state, every institution of law merchant was at the same time 
an institution of global law (Weltrechtsinsitutut).39  
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Cederberg rejected, however, Lewin Goldschmidt’s theory of commercial law. According to 
Goldschmidt, commercial law dealt with transactions that mediated the transfer of goods 
from producers to consumers. However, and here Cederberg follows Wieland, many 
institutions of commercial law had little or nothing to do with mediating goods – such as rules 
regarding the publishing of real estate conveyance books or the right to pursue a trade. 
Philipp Heck’s ideas suited Cederberg better. According to the father of the “Jurisprudence of 
Interests” (Interessenjurisprudenz),40 commercial law was a law of large companies (“das 
Recht des rechtsgeschäftlichen Massenbetriebs”). The distinctive feature of commercial was 
that it regulated “several, repetitive, and mutually dependant legal transactions.” For Heck, 
these mass relations had become the norm determining the legal content of commercial 
dealings whenever the parties had not specifically agreed otherwise. Limited companies were 
needed to handle the risks necessarily involved in mass transactions.41 
Unquestionably, Heck was a modern legal scholar. He did not believe in the historical 
explanations given for commercial law, but departed in terms of more modern 
understandings of commercial law. He had inherited this perspective from Rudolph von 
Ihering, who had completely discredited the historical legitimation of law and instead 
highlighted the functional consequences of law and legal decisions.42  
For Heck, the Massenbetrieb, or large company, was the decisive modern phenomenon, which 
explained and legitimized the need for commercial law. It was clear to him that commercial 
enterprises were “entangled in completely different kinds of numerous and complex legal 
relations than a hundred years ago.”43 Private legal relations were the relations that held 
modern society together: they were “the bonds that, as the division of labour advanced, kept 
the private economic elements of the social construction together.”44 As culture advanced, the 
uses of commercial law expanded.45  
                                                        
40 On Heck, see Ulrich Falk, “Heck, Phlipp, 1858–1943“ in Michael Stolleis (ed.), Juristen: ein biographisches 
Lexikon (München: Beck, 1995), 275.  
41 Philipp Heck, “Weshalb besteht ein von dem bürgerlichen Rechte gesondertes Handelsprivatrecht?” Archiv für 
civilistischen Praxis 92 (1902), 438–466.  
42 Rudolph von Ihering, Der Zweck im Recht (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1887). 
43 “Es bedarf nicht der näheren Ausführung, dass heute ganz anderen Kreise der Gewerbetreibenden in 
zahlreiche und komplizierte Rechtsbeziehung verstrikt sind, als vor 100 Jahren.” Heck, 464.  
44 “Privatrechtlichte Rechtsgeschäfte und aus ihnen hervorgehende Rechtsbeziehungen sind ja die Bande, durch 
welche bei fortgeschrittener Arbeitstheilung die privatwirtschaftlichen Elemente des sozialen Baus 
zusammengehalten werden.” 
45 “Deshalb wird die vertretene Deutung des Handelsrechts dadurch bestätigt, dass ihr Anwendungsgewicht bei 
fortschreitender Cultur sich ausdehnt.” 
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The growth of commerce was the obvious feature behind large-scale commerce, but it was 
much more as well. Division of labour characterized the modern commercial world as well:  If 
private law in general had become more commercial in nature – which was generally 
acknowledged at the time – this did not render commercial law useless. On the contrary, the 
growing number of commercial enterprises gave rise to constantly new situations requiring 
legal regulations. This was the case not only domestically, but even more so internationally. 
The need to develop commercial law was “especially intensive” because of the expansion of 
the law of bills of exchange, i.e. the law of sea and land transport. Large businesses were, 
according to Heck, suffered most as a result of inadequate national legal orders. Heck saw 
national insularity as a problem, and the (at least potentially) international nature of 
commercial law as a future promise and his field of law in particular as a “pioneer of progress” 
(“Pionier des Fortschritts”).46  
Heck did not feel the need to justify with examples his claims regarding the needs of 
commercial life. The huge changes that the German economic structure had experienced in 
the last couple of decades were obvious enough. Businesses had grown immensely. In 1882, 
26% of those employed in crafts and other industries worked in plants with more than 50 
employees. In 1907, 45% of all workers did so.  Whereas in 1882, 7% worked in businesses 
with over a 1000 employees, 14% did so in the year 1907. Some industries were more 
concentrated than others, with mining, engineering and textile and chemical industries 
leading the way.  Already since the eighteenth century, factory entrepreneurs (unlike 
artisans) had been considered merchants by law, and therefore they were obliged to submit 
their annual inventories and profit-and-loss accounts and to organize their bookkeeping 
according to the legal requirements for merchants. By the early twentieth century, producers 
had also increasingly taken over both the domestic and export trading of their products: 
electrical and chemical industries are typical examples as well as the sewing machine and 
bicycle industries.47 
                                                        
46 Heck, 466.  
47 Jürgen Kocka, “Entrepreneurs and Managers in German Industrialization,” in The Cambridge Economic History 
of Europe: VII: The Industrial Economies: Capital, Labour, and Enterprise (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), 492–589, 544, 556, 562. See also Jürgen Kocka – Hannes Siegrist, “Die hundert gröβten deutschen 
Industrieunternehmen im späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert: Expansion, Diversifikation und Integration im 
internationalen Vergleich, “ in Norbert Horn – Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Recht und Entwicklung der Groβunternehmen 
im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert: Wirtschafts-, sozial und rechtshistorische Untersuchungen im Deutschland, 
Frankreich, England und den USA (Göttingen: Vandenchoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 55–117, 79–84. 
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Heck’s emphasis on the international nature of commercial law stood in clear contrast with 
the efforts to codify commercial law. France had codified commercial law in 1808 and 
Germany already during the Deutscher Bund in 1861, and again as one of the first legal 
measures after unification in 1871 as well as in 1897.  If commercial law was to be developed 
as an international endeavour, how could it be codified? Cederberg took up the question of 
codification as well. In the Nordic countries, the codification of civil law had been debated 
since the 1820s. The mighty Napoleonic civil code stood in the background, and the 
international codification trends and discussions could not be ignored in Scandinavia either. 
Because of Finland’s annexation to imperial Russia as a result of the Napoleonic Wars, the 
question of codification received a different colouring in Finland. In the 1820s, Russia entered 
into a process of codifying its laws, and the project included all parts of the Empire. Finland 
was no exception. Yet leading Finnish jurists – on whose help Russians absolutely depended – 
refused to cooperate. This was because they feared that the codification process would not 
stop short of collecting and modernizing all Finnish laws that been issued after the 
promulgation of the Swedish Law of the Realm of 1734; they feared that the codification 
process would bring with it a Russification of the Grand Duchy’s laws. In both Sweden and 
Finland, codification as an issue had more or less died out by the mid-nineteenth century, and 
legal scholars assumed the leading role in modernizing laws according to foreign, mostly 
German, models.48  
Cederberg voiced sympathy for the idea of a limited codification with respect to the law of 
obligation, the planning of which had already been undertaken as a common Nordic project. 
Cederberg, after carefully weighing the pros and cons, assumed a positive attitude towards a 
common commercial code. However, he did not think that Finnish commercial law was yet, at 
the time of his writing, ripe for codification. This was his view even though he thought that, in 
principle, commercial law should not be viewed as separate from private law.49 Here, 
Cederberg’s views changed when he assumed the Chair of Commercial Law at the University 
of Helsinki. In 1925, Cederberg still thought that as far as statutory law was concerned, the 
                                                        
48 Elsewhere, I have explained the reasons for why the Nordic countries never codified their civil laws. See Heikki 
Pihlajamäk, “Private Law Codification, Modernization and Nationalism: A View from Critical Legal History,” 
Critical Analysis of Law 2:1 (2015), 135–152. The law of obligations was issued inh 1928 (Oikeustoimilaki).  
49 Lauri Cederberg, Näkökohtia Suomen velvoite- ja kauppaoikeuden kodifioimiskysymyksessä (Helsinki: 
Valtioneuvoston kirjapaino, 1919). Here, Cederberg followed the solution adopted in the Swiss Civil Code of 
1883, which did not distinguish between general private law and commercial law (Einheitsgesetzgebung); 
Ansgar Becker, Die Entwicklung des Kaufmannsbegriffs im Sinne eines übergeordneten Abgrenzungskriteriums für 
den persönlichen Anwendungsbereich handelsrechtlihcher Vorschriften (Münster: LIT, 2004), 104. 
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unity of commercial and private law should be maintained. From this perspective, it did not 
follow, “of course,” that commercial law should not be treated as a separate system in legal 
scholarship.50 
The reason for this argument is clear and it is similar to Heck’s argument regarding the 
international nature of commercial law. For Cederberg, however, internationalization was 
directed towards the neighbouring Nordic countries. Otherwise, he was not extremely 
enthusiastic about the international dimension of commercial law. A danger existed, wrote 
Cederberg, that if unification were to be successful at the level of statutory law, legal practice 
would nevertheless turn out quite differently. This would be the case because no international 
judicial authority existed to level out the differences.51  
Cederberg criticized Heck for his concept of Massenbetrieb, which could not capture the 
phenomenon of commercial law adequately. Instead, Cederberg wished to base his concept of 
commercial law on the concept of enterprise (företag, yritys, Betrieb). This conception of 
commercial law had already by Cederberg’s time rather deep roots in German legal 
scholarship. Wilhelm Endemann, in his Das Deutsche Handelsrecht of 1865, had already 
departed from this concept, though.52 Julius von Gierke, Heinrich Lehmann53 and Karl 
Wieland54 continued the same tradition.55 As Schmoeckel has remarked, one advantage of 
building commercial law around the concept of an enterprise was that it made it possible to 
take aspects of labour law into consideration.56 It was also obvious from the point of view of a 
Finnish legal scholar like Cederberg that such an understanding fit the Finnish economic 
reality much better than did the concept of a large enterprise – which did not at all dominate 
the Finnish economic scene in the early twentieth century.  
                                                        
50 Cederberg 1925, 3.  
51 Cederberg 1919, 34. 
52 Wilhelm Endemann, Das Deutsche Handelsrecht: systematisch dargestellt, Erste Atbtheilung (Heidelberg, 1865), 
74.  
53 Heinrich Lehmann, “Grundlinien des deutschen Industrierechts,” in Festschrift für Ernst Zitelmann (München, 
1913), 1–46. 
54 Karl Wieland, Handelsrecht, Erster Band: Das kaufmännische Unternehmen und die Handelsgesellschaften 
(Leipzig, 1921). 
55 The history has been summarized in many works. See, for instance, Knut Wolfgang Nörr, “Das Unternehmen in 
der Wirtschafts- und Rechtsordnung 1880 bi 1930: ein Beitrag zur Morfologie der organisierten Wirtschaft, in 
Helmut Coing et al. (eds.), Staat und Unternehmen aus der Sicht des Rechts (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1994); 
Gerhard Dilcher – Rudi Lauda, “Das Unternehmen als Gegenstand und Anknüpfungspunkt rechtlicher 
Regelungen in Deutschland  1860-1920” in Norbert Horn – Jürgen Kocka (eds.), Recht und Unternehmen im 19. 
und frühen 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 535–576; Mathias Schmoeckel, 
Rechtsgeschichte der Wirtschaft seit dem 19. Jahrhundert (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 2008), 116. 
56 Schmoeckel, 117.  
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Roughly at the same time, that is, in the decades preceding the First World War, the Finnish 
economy grew quite quickly. Between the years 1860 and 1913, the number of those working 
in the industrial and handicraft sector grew almost five-fold, from 31 000 to 148 000. As the 
population grew 1.7 times larger, the proportion of industrial and handicraft workers as a 
percentage of the whole working force grew from 4% in 1860 to 10% in 1910. The growth in 
the years 1890–1910 was especially vigorous. Although the rise was significant, Finland was 
still in 1910 a remarkably agrarian country.57 This was certainly the case in relation to 
Germany, but the agrarian nature of the Finnish economy was clear in relation to Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, too.58 Finland’s economy was different from both that of Germany and 
the other Scandinavian countries in that Finnish industrialization depended predominantly 
on a single industry, the sawmill industry, and its derivatives.59 
A “user’s perspective” to commercial law involves the need to consider law firms as well. They 
acted as important intermediaries between a law consisting of abstract norms and legal 
scholarship on the one hand, and the practical life of commerce on the other. Some lawyers 
began to specialize in providing counseling services to commercial enterprises from the 
1860s onwards, and the first law firms specializing in commercial law appeared in Helsinki in 
the following decades. Of these firms, Castrén & Snellman (1888) and Dittmar & Indrenius 
(1899) still exist.60 In fact, advocacy as a full-time profession emerged in part because of the 
drastic economic changes of the late nineteenth century. Modern advocacy and modern 
commercial law were in demand because of the rapid legislative reforms enacted in the Grand 
Duchy in the 1860s and 1870s. Traditional domestic commerce had not required specialized 
legal help of any kind. The normative framework had been simple, and if legal problems 
occurred, they could most likely be solved without the expertise of legal professionals. The 
situation was rapidly changing towards the late nineteenth century, however. Enterprises 
engaged in international commerce needed to prepare themselves proactively, put their 
                                                        
57 Viljo Rasila, “Ensimmäinen teollistumiskausi,” in Jorma Ahvenainen, Erkki Pihkala, Viljo Rasila (eds.), Suomen 
taloushistoria 2: teollistuva Suomi (Helsinki:Tammi, 1982), 11–171, 55; Antti Kuusterä – Juha Tarkka, Bank of 
Finland 200 years I: Imperial cashier to central bank (Helsinki: Otava, 2011), 313–319. 
58 K.-G. Hildebrand, “Labour and Capital in the Scandinavian Countries in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe: VII: The Industrial Economies: Capital, Labour, and 
Enterprise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 590–628, 624. 
59 Hildebrand, 624; Rasila, 88.  
60 See, Heikki Pihlajamäki, Kansan ja esivallan välissä: suomalaisen asianajajakunnan historia (Helsinki: Suomen 
Asianajajaliitto, 2009), 106.  
 17 
contractual framework in order and make sure their apparatus corresponded to the 
exigencies of modern law.  
The law firms operated, furthermore, within a growing network of economic operators, the 
increasing activity of which is shown in the way these non-legal economic operators 
organized themselves at the national level. The Finnish Organization of Creditors (Suomen 
Luotonantajayhdistys -  Finska Kreditgivareföreningen) was founded in 1905, the Finnish 
Association of Forwarding Agents (Suomen Speditööriyhdistys - Finska Speditörföreningen) 
in 1906, the Helsinki Association of Commercial Agents (Helsingin Agenttiyhdistys - 
Helsingfors Agentförening) in 1911 and the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1912. 
 
IV. Conclusion: centres, peripheries, transplants and importers  
 
When trying to come to grips with the differences between societies, comparative social 
scientists and historians have long employed the terms centre and periphery – usually in 
order to highlight the Western world’s superiority as compared to other parts of the world. 
The theoretical development of such a perspective began, however, only in the 1970s when 
social and political historians assumed a critical stance towards the Western countries as the 
self-evident centre of global development. The abuse of those living in colonized parts of the 
world by the Western powers became a self-evident part of these discussions. Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s “world system” became the best-known example of the practical uses of the 
concepts centre and periphery.61 
In the theory of comparative law or legal history, the concepts have not been developed much 
at all.  (A widely read article by Douglas Osler talks about similar things, though, without 
employing the terminology.62) Traditional European legal history, from Wieacker to Bellomo, 
has really been interested in the “centre” only, if it is defined as the traditional core area of ius 
commune: Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands.  As Osler explains, each of these 
regions have their periods of prominence in the traditional story, though otherwise remaining 
in the margins. Thus, Italy predominated during the Middle Ages, France during the period of 
                                                        
61 T. C. Champion (ed.), Centre and Periphery: Comparative Studies in Archaeology (London: Routledge), 2–9.  
62 Douglas Osler, “The Myth of European Legal History,” Rechtshistorisches Journal 16, 393–410.  
 18 
humanism, followed by the Netherlands and then Germany in the nineteenth century. The rest 
of Europe barely existed at all during the periods in question, at least not the Nordic countries.  
In recent works by Nordic legal historians, the Nordic region often figures as a periphery in 
relation to the centre. It is the centre that provides the influences, while the periphery adapts 
to them. My own work on Finnish evidence law in the nineteenth century, Elsa Trolle 
Önnerfor’s study of early modern Swedish law in wills, and Mia Korpiola’s book on early 
modern Swedish marriage laws provide examples of this dynamic.63 All of these works show 
how ideas originally produced in the centre are transferred to the periphery. However, the 
reception is not passive. The legal transplants or objects of reception – the terminology is 
endless – change during the process of transference, and the product may sometimes look 
quite different than it did at the starting point.  
Sometimes the comparative constellations are more complex than in the three cases 
mentioned above. My recent book on law in the seventeenth century is a case in point. In 
Livonia, conquered by the Swedes in the 1620s, Livonian law was clearly peripheral in 
relation to the gemeines Recht, the German version of the ius commune, but it is much more 
difficult to determine whether it was peripheral in relation to Swedish law as well. A complex 
set of legal, cultural and political factors became intermingled in this instance.64  
It is thus worthwhile to keep in mind that the division into centres and peripheries is not fixed 
once and for all. There may be cases in which one region is peripheral in relation to another in 
a certain respect, but central insofar as other issues are considered. Returning to the problem 
of commercial law, and allowing for the reservations expressed above, German nineteenth-
century legal scholarship can well be regarded as representing the centre, the scholarly 
products of which were copied not only in Finland but in other parts of the world as well. In 
this respect, Finland was a periphery not a centre because the influences moved from 
Germany to Finland, and never vice versa.  
                                                        
63 Heikki Pihlajamäki, Evidence, Crime, and the Legal Professsion: The Emergence of Free Evaluation of Evidence in 
Nineteenth-Century Finland (Lund: Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning, 1997); Mia Korpiola, Between Betrothal and 
Bedding: Between Betrothal and Bedding (Leuven: Brill, 2009); Elsa Trolle Önnerfors, Justitia et prudentia: 
Rättsbildning genom tillämpning, Svea hovrätt och testamentsmålen 1640–1690 (Stockholm: Institutet för rättshistorisk 
forskning, 2014).  
64 See Heikki Pihlajamäki, Conquest and the Law in Swedish Livonia (ca. 1630–1710): A Case of Legal Pluralism in 
Early Modern Europe (Leuven: Brill, 2017).  
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Cederberg’s opinions regarding commercial law, however, did not develop in a vacuum. The 
practical needs for commercial law had developed during the preceding decades, as the 
Finnish commercial scene experienced tremendous changes beginning in the 1880s. A new 
legal framework was needed. Cederberg, as the main importer of the modern doctrine of 
commercial law to Finland, did not primarily turn to Sweden, which at later stages of Finnish 
history became a major source of influence for Finnish scholars. In Cederberg’s time, Swedish 
scholarship on commercial law still did not offer much of a framework. Thus, Cederberg 
turned his attention to Germany since it was at the forefront of global legal scholarship at that 
time. He did not, however, adopt the German teachings passively. Instead, as importers of 
legal doctrines always do, Cederberg weighed the various different possibilities offered by the 
globally supreme German legal doctrine. He read widely, picking and choosing as he did so, 
and then applied his readings to Finnish circumstances. In doing so, he acted much in the 
same way that other successful importers of legal doctrines had done previously – and were 
doing precisely at the same time as Cederberg was engaged in constructing the foundations of 





                                                        
65 For an early example of an importer of legal ideas, see my article on Olaus Petri, the principal Swedish theologian 
and legal thinker of the sixteenth century; Heikki Pihlajamäki, “Gründer, Bewahrer oder Vermittler? Die nationalen 
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Fakultäten und Juristenausbildung im Ostseeraum (Stockholm: Institutet för rättshistorisk forskning, 2004), 29–
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